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Abstract
We explore the possibility of a Bohmian approach to the problem
of finding a quantum theory incorporating gravitational phenomena.
The major conceptual problems of canonical quantum gravity are the
problem of time and the problem of diffeomorphism invariant observ-
ables. We find that these problems are artifacts of the subjectivity
and vagueness inherent in the framework of orthodox quantum theory.
When we insist upon ontological clarity—the distinguishing character-
istic of a Bohmian approach—these conceptual problems vanish. We
shall also discuss the implications of a Bohmian perspective for the
significance of the wave function, concluding with unbridled specula-
tion as to why the universe should be governed by laws so apparently
bizarre as those of quantum mechanics.
∗To appear in Physics Meets Philosophy at the Planck Scale, edited by C.Callender
and N.Huggett (Cambridge University Press).
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1 Introduction
The term “3-geometry” makes sense as well in quantum geometrodynamics
as in classical theory. So does superspace. But space-time does not. Give a
3-geometry, and give its time rate of change. That is enough, under typical
circumstances to fix the whole time-evolution of the geometry; enough in
other words, to determine the entire four-dimensional space-time geometry,
provided one is considering the problem in the context of classical physics. In
the real world of quantum physics, however, one cannot give both a dynamic
variable and its time-rate of change. The principle of complementarity for-
bids. Given the precise 3-geometry at one instant, one cannot also know at
that instant the time-rate of change of the 3-geometry. . . . The uncertainty
principle thus deprives one of any way whatsoever to predict, or even to give
meaning to, “the deterministic classical history of space evolving in time.”
No prediction of spacetime, therefore no meaning for spacetime, is the verdict
of the quantum principle.
Misner, Thorne, Wheeler 1973
One of the few propositions about quantum gravity that most physicists
in the field would agree upon, that our notion of space-time must, at best, be
altered considerably in any theory conjoining the basic principles of quantum
mechanics with those of general relativity, will be questioned in this article.
We will argue, in fact, that most, if not all, of the conceptual problems in
quantum gravity arise from the sort of thinking on display in the preceding
quotation.
It is also widely agreed, almost 40 years after the first attempts to quan-
tize general relativity, that there is still no single set of ideas on how to
proceed, and certainly no physical theory successfully concluding this pro-
gram. Rather, there are a great variety of approaches to quantum gravity; for
a detailed overview, see, e.g., Rovelli [20]. While the different approaches to
quantum gravity often have little in common, they all are intended ultimately
to provide us with a consistent quantum theory agreeing in its predictions
with general relativity in the appropriate physical domain. Although we
will focus here on the conceptual problems faced by those approaches which
amount to a canonical quantization of classical general relativity, the main
lessons will apply to most of the other approaches as well.
This is because, as we shall argue, many of these difficulties arise from
the subjectivity and the ontological vagueness inherent in the very framework
of orthodox quantum theory, a framework taken for granted by almost all
approaches to quantum gravity. We shall sketch how most, and perhaps
all, of the conceptual problems of canonical quantum gravity vanish if we
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insist upon formulating our cosmological theories in such a manner that it is
reasonably clear what they are about—if we insist, that is, upon ontological
clarity—and, at the same time, avoid any reference to such vague notions as
measurement, observers, and observables.
The earliest approach, canonical quantum gravity, amounts to quantiz-
ing general relativity according to the usual rules of canonical quantization.
However, to apply canonical quantization to general relativity, the latter
must first be cast into canonical form. Since the quantization of the stan-
dard canonical formulation of general relativity, the Arnowitt, Deser, Misner
formulation [1], has led to severe conceptual and technical difficulties, non-
standard choices of canonical variables, such as in the Ashtekar formulation
[2] and in loop quantum gravity [21], have been used as starting points for
quantization. While some of the technical problems have been resolved by
these new ideas, the basic conceptual problems have not been addressed.
After the great empirical success of the standard model in particle physics,
the hope arose that the gravitational interaction could also be incorporated
in a similar model. The search for such a unified theory led to string theory,
which apparently reproduces not only the standard model but also general
relativity in a suitable low energy limit. However, since string theory is, after
all, a quantum theory, it retains all the conceptual difficulties of quantum
theory, and our criticisms and conclusions pertaining to quantum theory in
general, in Sections 3 and 4 of this article, will apply to it as well. Nonethe-
less, our focus, again, will be on the canonical approaches, restricted for
simplicity to pure gravity, ignoring matter.
This article is organized as follows: In Section 2 we will sketch the funda-
mental conceptual problems faced by most approaches to quantum gravity.
The seemingly unrelated problems in the foundations of orthodox quantum
theory will be touched upon in Section 3. Approaches to the resolution
of these problems based upon the demand for ontological clarity will be dis-
cussed in Section 4, where we will focus on the simplest such approach, the de
Broglie-Bohm theory or Bohmian mechanics. Our central point will be made
in Section 5, where we indicate how the conceptual problems of canonical
quantum gravity disappear when the main insights of the Bohmian approach
to quantum theory are applied.
Finally, in Section 6, we will discuss how the status and significance of the
wave function, in Bohmian mechanics as well as in orthodox quantum theory,
is radically altered when we adopt a universal perspective. This altered status
of the wave function, together with the very stringent symmetry demands so
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central to general relativity, suggests the possibility—though by no means the
inevitability—of finding an answer to the question, Why should the universe
be governed by laws so apparently peculiar as those of quantum mechanics?
2 The conceptual problems of quantum grav-
ity
In the canonical approach to quantum gravity one must first reformulate
general relativity as a Hamiltonian dynamical system. This was done by
ADM [1], using the 3-metric gij(x
a) on a space-like hypersurface Σ as the
configurational variable and the extrinsic curvature of the hypersurface as
its conjugate momentum piij(xa)1. The real time parameter of usual Hamil-
tonian systems is replaced by a “multi-fingered time” corresponding to arbi-
trary deformations dΣ of the hypersurface. These deformations are split into
two groups: those changing only the three dimensional coordinate system
xa on the hypersurface (with which, as part of what is meant by the hyper-
surface, it is assumed to be equipped) and deformations of the hypersurface
along its normal vector field. While the changes of the canonical variables
under both kind of deformations are generated by Hamiltonian functions
on phase space, Hi(g, pi) for spatial diffeomorphisms and H(g, pi) for nor-
mal deformations, their changes under pure coordinate transformations on
the hypersurfaces are dictated by their geometrical meaning. The dynamics
of the theory is therefore determined by the Hamiltonian functions H(g, pi)
generating changes under normal deformations of the hypersurface.
Denote by N(xa) the freely specifiable lapse function that determines how
far, in terms of proper length, one moves the space-like hypersurface at the
point x = (xa) along its normal vector: This distance is N(xa)dτ, where
τ is a parameter labeling the successive hypersurfaces arrived at under the
deformation (and defined by this equation). The infinitesimal changes of the
canonical variables are then generated by the Hamiltonian HN associated
with N (an integral over Σ of the product of N with a Hamiltonian density
H(g, pi; xa)):
1Actually the extrinsic curvature is given byKij = Gijabpi
ab where Gijab is the so called
supermetric, which is itself a function of gij . This distinction is, however, not relevant to
our discussion.
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dgij(x
a) =
δHN(g, pi)
δpiij(xa)
dτ
dpiij(xa) = −
δHN(g, pi)
δgij(xa)
dτ . (1)
In what follows we shall denote by H(g, pi) the collection {HN(g, pi)} of all
such Hamiltonians (or, what comes pretty much to the same thing, the col-
lection {H(g, pi; x)} for all points x ∈ Σ) and similarly for Hi.
It is important to stress that the theory can be formulated completely in
terms of geometrical objects on a three dimensional manifold, with no a priori
need to refer to its embedding into a space-time. A solution of (1) is a family
of 3-metrics g(τ) that can be glued together to build up a 4-metric using
the lapse function N (to determine the transverse geometry). In this way
the space-time metric emerges dynamically when one evolves the canonical
variables with respect to multi-fingered time.
However, the initial canonical data cannot be chosen arbitrarily, but must
obey certain constraints: Only for initial conditions that lie in the subman-
ifold of phase space on which Hi(g, pi) and H(g, pi) vanish do the solutions
(space-time metrics gµν(x
µ)) also satisfy Einstein’s equations. In fact, away
from this so called constraint manifold the theory is not even well defined,
at least not as a theory involving a multi-fingered time, since the solutions
would depend on the special way we choose to evolve the space-like hypersur-
face, i.e., on the choice of N(xa), to build up space-time. Of course, a theory
based on a single choice, for example N(xa) = 1, would be well defined, at
least formally.
By the same token, the invariance of the theory under space-time diffeo-
morphisms is no longer so obvious as in the formulation in terms of Einstein’s
equations: In the ADM formulation 4-diffeomorphism invariance amounts to
the requirement that one ends up with the same space-time, up to coordinate
transformations, regardless of which path in multi-fingered time is followed,
i.e., which lapse functionN , or τ -dependent sequence of lapse functions N(τ),
is used. This says that for the space-time built up from any particular choice
of multi-fingered time, the dynamical equations (1) will be satisfied for any
foliation of the resulting space-time into space-like hypersurfaces—using in
(1) the lapse function N(τ) associated with that foliation—and not just for
the foliation associated with that particular choice.
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Formally, it is now straightforward to quantize this constrained Hamilto-
nian theory using Dirac’s rules for the quantization of constrained systems
[8]. First one must replace the canonical variables gij and pi
ij by operators gˆij
and pˆiij = −i δ
δgij
satisfying the canonical commutation relations.2 One then
formally inserts these into the Hamiltonian functions H(g, pi) and Hi(g, pi) of
the classical theory to obtain operators Ĥ(gˆ, pˆi) and Ĥi(gˆ, pˆi) acting on func-
tionals Ψ(g) on the configuration space of 3-metrics. Since the Hamiltonians
were constrained in the classical theory one demands that the correspond-
ing operators annihilate the physical states in the corresponding quantum
theory:
ĤΨ = 0 (2)
ĤiΨ = 0 . (3)
Equation (3) has a simple meaning, namely that Ψ(g) be invariant under 3-
diffeomorphisms (coordinate changes on the 3-manifold), so that it depends
on the 3-metric g only through the 3-geometry. However, the interpretation
of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (2) is not at all clear.
Before discussing the several problems which arise in attempts to give
a physical meaning to the approach just described, a few remarks are in
order: While we have omitted many technical details and problems from
our schematic description of the “Dirac constraint quantization” of gravity,
these problems either do not concern, or are consequences of, the main con-
ceptual problems of canonical quantum gravity. Other approaches, such as
the canonical quantization of the Ashtekar formulation of classical general
relativity and its further development into loop quantum gravity, resolve
some of the technical problems faced by canonical quantization in the metric
representation, but leave the main conceptual problems untouched.
Suppose now that we have found a solution Ψ(g) to equations (2) and (3).
What physical predictions would be implied? In orthodox quantum theory
a solution Ψt of the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation provides us with
a time-dependent probability distribution |Ψt|
2, as well as with the absolute
square of other time-dependent probability amplitudes. The measurement
problem and the like aside, the physical meaning of these is reasonably clear:
they are probabilities for the results of the measurement of the configuration
or of other observables. But any attempt to interpret canonical quantum
gravity along orthodox lines immediately faces the following problems:
2We choose units in which h¯ and c are 1.
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• The problem of time: In canonical quantum gravity there is no
time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation; it was replaced by the time-
independent Wheeler-DeWitt equation. The Hamiltonians—the gener-
ators of multi-fingered-time evolution in the classical case—annihilate
the state vector and therefore cease to generate any evolution at all.
The theory provides us with only a timeless wave function on the config-
uration space of 3-metrics, i.e., on the possible configurations of space,
not of space-time. But how can a theory that provides us (at best) with
a single fixed probability distribution for configurations of space ever
be able to describe the always changing world in which we live? This,
in a nutshell, is the problem of time in canonical quantum gravity.
• The problem of 4-diffeomorphism invariance: The fundamental
symmetry at the heart of general relativity is its invariance under gen-
eral coordinate transformations of space-time. It is important to stress
that almost any theory can be formulated in such a 4-diffeomorphism
invariant manner by adding further structure to the theory (e.g., a pre-
ferred foliation of space-time as a dynamical object). General relativity
has what is sometimes called serious diffeomorphism-invariance, mean-
ing that it involves no space-time structure beyond the 4-metric and, in
particular, singles out no special foliation of space-time. In canonical
quantum gravity, while the invariance under coordinate transforma-
tions of space is retained, it is not at all clear what 4-diffeomorphism
invariance could possibly mean. Therefore the basic symmetry, and
arguably the essence, of general relativity seems to be lost in quantiza-
tion.
• The problem of “no outside observer”: One of the most fascinat-
ing applications of quantum gravity is to quantum cosmology. Ortho-
dox quantum theory attains physical meaning only via its predictions
about the statistics of outcomes of measurements of observables, per-
formed by observers that are not part of the system under considera-
tion, and seems to make no clear physical statements about the behav-
ior of a closed system, not under observation. The quantum formalism
concerns the interplay between—and requires for its very meaning—
two kinds of objects: a quantum system and a more or less classical
apparatus. It is hardly imaginable how one could make any sense out of
this formalism for quantum cosmology, for which the system of interest
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is the whole universe, a closed system if there ever was one.
• The problem of diffeomorphism invariant observables: Even if
we pretend for the moment that we are able to give meaning to the
quantum formalism without referring to an observer located outside
of the universe, we encounter a more subtle difficulty. Classical gen-
eral relativity is fundamentally diffeomorphism invariant. It is only the
space-time geometry, not the 4-metric nor the identity of the individ-
ual points in the space-time manifold, that has physical significance.
Therefore the physical observables in general relativity should be in-
dependent of special coordinate systems; they must be invariant under
4-diffeomorphisms, which are in effect generated by the Hamiltonians
H and Hi. Since the quantum observables are constructed, via quanti-
zation, from the classical ones, it would seem that they must commute
with the Hamiltonians Ĥ and Ĥi. But such diffeomorphism invariant
quantum observables are extremely hard to come by, and there are cer-
tainly far too few of them to even begin to account for the bewildering
variety of our experience which it is the purpose of quantum theory to
explain. (For a discussion of the question of existence of diffeomorphism
invariant observables, see Kucharˇ [17].)
These conceptual problems, and the attempts to solve them, have lead to
a variety of technical problems that are discussed in much detail in, e.g.,
Kucharˇ [17], [18] and Isham [15]. However, since we are not aware of any or-
thodox proposals successfully resolving the conceptual problems, we shall not
discuss such details here. Rather, we shall proceed in the opposite direction,
toward their common cause, and argue that they originate in a deficiency
shared with, and inherited from, orthodox quantum mechanics: the lack of
a coherent ontology.
Regarding the first two problems of canonical quantum gravity, it is not
hard to discern their origin: the theory is concerned only with configurations
of and on space, the notion of a space-time having entirely disappeared. It
is true that even with classical general relativity, Newton’s external absolute
time is abandoned. But a notion of time, for an observer located somewhere
in space-time and employing a coordinate system of his convenience, is re-
tained, emerging from space-time. The problem of time in canonical quan-
tum gravity is a direct consequence of the fact that in an orthodox quantum
theory for space-time itself we must insist on its nonexistence (compare the
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quote at the beginning of this article). Similarly, the problem of diffeomor-
phism invariance, or, better, the problem of not even being able to address
this question properly, is an immediate consequence of having no notion of
space-time in orthodox quantum gravity.
3 The basic problem of orthodox quantum
theory: the lack of a coherent ontology
Despite its extraordinary predictive successes, quantum theory has, since its
inception some seventy-five years ago, been plagued by severe conceptual dif-
ficulties. The most widely cited of these is the measurement problem, best
known as the paradox of Schro¨dinger’s cat. For many physicists the mea-
surement problem is, in fact, not a but the conceptual difficulty of quantum
theory.
In orthodox quantum theory the wave function of a physical system is
regarded as providing its complete description. But when we analyze the
process of measurement itself in quantum mechanical terms, we find that
the after-measurement wave function for system and apparatus arising from
Schro¨dinger’s equation for the composite system typically involves a super-
position over terms corresponding to what we would like to regard as the var-
ious possible results of the measurement—e.g., different pointer orientations.
Since it seems rather important that the actual result of the measurement
be a part of the description of the after-measurement situation, it is difficult
to believe that the wave function alone provides the complete description of
that situation.
The usual collapse postulate for quantum measurement solves this prob-
lem for all practical purposes, but only at the very steep price of the intro-
duction of an observer or classical measurement apparatus as an irreducible,
unanalyzable element of the theory. This leads to a variety of further prob-
lems. The unobserved physical reality becomes drastically different from
the observed, even on the macroscopic level of daily life. Even worse, with
the introduction at a fundamental level of such vague notions as classical
measurement apparatus, the physical theory itself becomes unprofessionally
vague and ill defined. The notions of observation and measurement can
hardly be captured in a manner appropriate to the standards of rigor and
clarity that should be demanded of a fundamental physical theory. And in
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quantum cosmology the notion of an external observer is of course entirely
obscure.
The collapse postulate is, in effect, an unsuccessful attempt to evade the
measurement problem without taking seriously its obvious implication: that
the wave function does not provide a complete description of physical reality.
If we do accept this conclusion, we must naturally inquire about the nature of
the more complete description with which a less problematical formulation
of quantum theory should be concerned. We must ask, which theoretical
entities, in addition to the wave function, might the theory describe? What
mathematical objects and structures represent entities that, according to the
theory, simply are, regardless of whether or not they are observed? We must
ask, in other words, about the primitive ontology of the theory, what the
theory is fundamentally about (see Goldstein [11]). And when we know what
the theory is really about, measurement and observation become secondary
phenomenological concepts that, like anything else in a world governed by
the theory, can be analyzed in terms of the behavior of its primitive ontology.
By far the simplest possibility for the primitive ontology is that of par-
ticles described by their positions. The corresponding theory, for non-rela-
tivistic particles, is Bohmian mechanics.
4 Bohmian mechanics
According to Bohmian mechanics the complete description of an n-particle
system is provided by its wave function Ψ together with its configuration
Q = (Q1, . . . ,Qn), where the Qk are the positions of its particles. The wave
function, which evolves according to Schro¨dinger’s equation, choreographs
the motion of the particles: these evolve—in the simplest manner possible—
according to a first-order ordinary differential equation
dQ
dt
= vΨ(Q)
whose right hand side, a velocity vector field on configuration space, is gen-
erated by the wave function. Considerations of simplicity and space-time
symmetry—Galilean and time-reversal invariance—then determine the form
of vΨ, yielding the defining (evolution) equations of Bohmian mechanics (for
spinless particles):
dQk
dt
= vΨk (Q1, . . . ,Qn) =
h¯
mk
Im
∇qkΨ
Ψ
(Q1, . . . ,Qn) (4)
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and
ih¯
∂Ψ
∂t
= ĤΨ (5)
where Ĥ is the usual Schro¨dinger Hamiltonian, containing as parameters the
masses m1, . . . , mn of the particles as well as the potential energy function
V of the system. For an n-particle universe, these two equations form a
complete specification of the theory. There is no need, and indeed no room,
for any further axioms, describing either the behavior of other “observables”
or the effects of “measurement.”
Bohmian mechanics is the most naively obvious embedding imaginable
of Schro¨dinger’s equation into a completely coherent physical theory! If
one didn’t already know better, one would naturally conclude that it can’t
“work,” i.e., that it can’t account for quantum phenomena. After all, if some-
thing so obvious and, indeed, so trivial works, great physicists—so it would
seem—would never have insisted, as they have and as they continue to do,
that quantum theory demands radical epistemological and metaphysical in-
novations.
Moreover, it is hard to avoid wondering how Bohmian mechanics could
have much to do with quantum theory? Where is quantum randomness
in this deterministic theory? Where is quantum uncertainty? Where are
operators as observables and all the rest?
Be that as it may, Bohmian mechanics is certainly a theory. It describes
a world in which particles participate in a highly non-Newtonian motion, and
it would do so even if this motion had absolutely nothing to do with quantum
mechanics.
It turns out, however, as a surprising consequence of the equations (4) and
(5), that when a system has wave function Ψ, its configuration is typically
random, with probability density ρ given by ρ = |Ψ|2, the quantum equilib-
rium distribution. In other words, it turns out that systems are somehow
typically in quantum equilibrium. Moreover, this conclusion comes together
with the clarification of what precisely this means, and also implies that a
Bohmian universe embodies an absolute uncertainty which can itself be re-
garded as the origin of the uncertainty principle. We shall not go into these
matters here, since we have discussed them at length elsewhere (Du¨rr, Gold-
stein and Zangh`ı [9]). We note, however, that nowadays, with chaos theory
and nonlinear dynamics so fashionable, it is not generally regarded as terribly
astonishing for an appearance of randomness to emerge from a deterministic
dynamical system.
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It also turns out that the entire quantum formalism, operators as ob-
servables and all the rest, is a consequence of Bohmian mechanics, emerg-
ing from an analysis of idealized measurement-like situations (for details,
see Daumer et al. [6] and [7]; see also Bohm [4]). There is no measure-
ment problem in Bohmian mechanics because the complete description of
the after-measurement situation includes, in addition to the wave function,
the definite configuration of the system and apparatus. While the wave func-
tion may still be a superposition of states corresponding to macroscopically
different possible outcomes, the actual configuration singles out the outcome
that has occurred.
Why have we elaborated in such detail on non-relativistic quantum me-
chanics and Bohmian mechanics if our main concern here is with quan-
tum gravity? Because there are two important lessons to be learned from
a Bohmian perspective on quantum theory. First of all, the existence of
Bohmian mechanics demonstrates that the characteristic features of quantum
theory, usually viewed as fundamental—intrinsic randomness, operators as
observables, non-commutativity, and uncertainty—need play no role whatso-
ever in the formulation of a quantum theory, naturally emerging instead, as a
consequence of the theory, in special measurement-like situations. Therefore
we should perhaps not be too surprised when approaches to quantum gravity
that regard these features as fundamental encounter fundamental conceptual
difficulties. Second, the main point of our paper is made transparent in the
simple example of Bohmian mechanics. If we base our theory on a coherent
ontology, the conceptual problems may disappear, and, what may be even
more important, a genuine understanding of the features that have seemed
most puzzling might be achieved.
We shall now turn to what one might call a Bohmian approach to quantum
gravity.
5 Bohmian quantum gravity
The transition from quantum mechanics to Bohmian mechanics is very sim-
ple, if not trivial: one simply incorporates the actual configuration into the
theory as the basic variable, and stipulates that this evolve in a natural way,
suggested by symmetry and by Schro¨dinger’s equation. The velocity field
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vΨt is, in fact, related to the quantum probability current jΨt by
vΨt =
jΨt
|Ψt|2
,
suggesting, since ρΨ = |Ψ|2 satisfies the continuity equation with jΨt =
ρΨtvΨt , that the empirical predictions of Bohmian mechanics, for positions
and ultimately, in fact, for other “observables” as well, agree with those of
quantum mechanics (as in fact they do; see Du¨rr et al. [9]).
Formally, one can follow exactly the same procedure in canonical quantum
gravity, where the configuration space is the space of (positive-definite) 3-
metrics (on an appropriate fixed manifold). The basic variable in Bohmian
quantum gravity is therefore the 3-metric g (representing the geometry on a
space-like hypersurface of the space-time to be generated by the dynamics)
and its change under (what will become) normal deformations is given by
a vector field on configuration space generated by the wave function Ψ(g).
Considerations analogous to those for non-relativistic particles lead to the
following form for the Bohmian equation of motion:
dgij(x
a) = Gijab(x
a)Im
(
Ψ(g)−1
δΨ(g)
δgab(xa)
)
N(xa) dτ . (6)
The wave function Ψ(g) is a solution of the timeless Wheeler-DeWitt equa-
tion (2) and therefore does not evolve. But the vector field on the right hand
side of (6) that it generates is typically nonvanishing if Ψ(g) is complex, lead-
ing to a nontrivial evolution g(τ) of the 3-metric. Suitably gluing together
the 3-metrics g(τ), we obtain a space-time (see the paragraph after equation
(1)). Interpretations of canonical quantum gravity along these lines have been
proposed by, e.g., Holland [14] and discussed, e.g., by Shtanov [22]. Minisu-
perspace Bohmian cosmologies have been considered by Kowalski-Glikman
and Vink [16], Squires [23] and Callender and Weingard [5].
However, there is a crucial point which is often overlooked or, at least,
not made sufficiently clear in the literature. A space-time generated by a
solution of (2) via (6) will in general depend on the choice of lapse function
N (or N(τ)). Thus the theory is not well defined as so far formulated. There
are essentially two ways to complete the theory. Either one chooses a special
lapse function N , e.g., N = 1, or one employs only special solutions Ψ of (2),
those yielding a vector field that generates an N -independent space-time.
In the first case, with special N but general solution Ψ of (2), the general
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covariance of the theory will typically be broken, the theory incorporating
a special foliation (see the paragraph before the one containing equation
(2)). The possible existence of special solutions giving rise to a covariant
dynamics will be discussed in more detail elsewhere (Goldstein and Teufel,
[12]), and will be touched upon towards the end of Section 6. However, most
the following discussion, especially in the first part of Section 6, does not
depend upon whether or not the theory incorporates a special foliation.
Let us now examine the impact of the Bohmian formulation of canoni-
cal quantum gravity on the basic conceptual problems of orthodox canon-
ical quantum gravity. Since a solution to the equations of Bohmian quan-
tum gravity defines a space-time, the problem of time is resolved in the
most satisfactory way: Time plays exactly the same role as in classical gen-
eral relativity; there is no need whatsoever for an external absolute time,
which has seemed so essential to orthodox quantum theory. The problem of
diffeomorphism-invariance is ameliorated, in that in this formulation it is at
least clear what diffeomorphism-invariance means. But, as explained above,
general covariance can be expected at most for special solutions of (2). If it
should turn out, however, that we must abandon general covariance on the
fundamental level by introducing a special foliation of space-time, it may still
be possible to retain it on the observational level (see, e.g., Mu¨nch-Berndl et
al. [19], where it is also argued, however, that a special, dynamical, foliation
of space-time need not be regarded as incompatible with serious covariance).
A short answer to the problems connected with the role of observers
and observables is this: There can be no such problems in the Bohmian
formulation of canonical quantum gravity since observers and observables
play no role in this formulation. But this is perhaps too short. What, after
all, is wrong with the observation that, since individual space-time points
have no physical meaning, physically significant quantities must correspond
to diffeomorphism-invariant observables, of which there are far too few to
describe very much of what we most care about?
The basic answer, we believe, is this: We ourselves are not—or, at least,
need not be3—diffeomorphism invariant: Most physical questions of rele-
vance to us are not formulated in a diffeomorphism invariant manner be-
cause, naturally enough, they refer to our own special location in space-time.
3In some models of quantum cosmology, e.g., those permitting the definition of a global
time function, it may well be possible to pick ourselves out in a diffeomorphism-invariant
manner.
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Nonetheless, we know very well what they mean—we know, e.g., what it
means to ask where and when something happens with respect to our own
point of view. Such questions can be addressed, in fact because of diffeo-
morphism invariance, by taking into account the details of our environment
and asking about the local predictions of the theory conditioned on such an
environment, past and present.
The observer who sets the frame of reference for his physical predictions
is part of and located inside the system—the universe. In classical general
relativity this is not at all problematical, since that theory provides us with a
coherent ontology, a potentially complete description of space-time and, if we
wish, a description taking into account our special point of view in the uni-
verse. But once the step to quantum theory is taken, the coherent space-time
ontology is replaced by an incoherent “ontology” of quantum observables. In
orthodox quantum theory this problem can be talked away by introducing an
outside observer actually serving two purposes: the observer sets the frame
of reference with respect to which the predictions are to be understood, a
totally legitimate and sensible purpose. But of course the main reason for the
focus on observers in quantum theory is that it is only with respect to them
that the intrinsically incoherent quantum description of the system under
observation can be given any meaning. In quantum cosmology, however, no
outside observer is at hand, neither for setting a frame of reference nor for
transforming the incoherent quantum picture into a coherent one.
In Bohmian quantum gravity, again, both problems disappear. Since we
have a coherent description of the system itself, in this case the universe,
there is no need for an outside observer in order to give meaning to the
theory. Nor do we have to worry about the diffeomorphism invariance of
observables, since we are free to refer to observers who are themselves part
of the system.
There is, however, an important aspect of the problem of time that we
have not yet addressed. From a Bohmian perspective, as we have seen, a time-
dependent wave function, satisfying Schro¨dinger’s equation, is by no means
necessary to understand the possibility of what we call change. Nonetheless,
a great deal of physics is, in fact, described by such time-dependent wave
functions. We shall see in the next section how these also naturally emerge
from the structure of Bohmian quantum gravity, which fundamentally has
only a timeless universal wave function.
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6 A universal Bohmian theory
When Bohmian mechanics is viewed from a universal perspective, the status
of the wave function is dramatically altered. To appreciate what we have in
mind here, it might help to consider two very common objections to Bohmian
mechanics.
Bohmian mechanics violates the action-reaction principle that is cen-
tral to all of modern physics, both classical and (non-Bohmian) quantum:
In Bohmian mechanics there is no back-action of the configuration upon
the wave function, which evolves, autonomously, according to Schro¨dinger’s
equation. And the wave function, which is part of the state description of—
and hence presumably part of the reality comprising—a Bohmian universe,
is not the usual sort of physical field on physical space (like the electromag-
netic field) to which we are accustomed, but rather a field on the abstract
space of all possible configurations, a space of enormous dimension, a space
constructed, it would seem, by physicists as a matter of convenience.
It should be clear by now what, from a universal viewpoint, the answer
to these objections must be: As first suggested by Du¨rr et al. [10], the wave
function Ψ of the universe should be regarded as a representation, not of
substantial physical reality, but of physical law. In a universal Bohmian the-
ory Ψ should be a functional of the configurations of all elements of physical
reality: geometry, particle positions, field or string configurations, or what-
ever primitive ontology turns out to describe nature best. As in the case of
pure quantum gravity, Ψ should be a (special) solution of some fundamental
equation (such as the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (2) with additional terms
for particles, fields, etc.). Such a universal wave function would be static—a
wave function whose timelessness constitutes the problem of time in canoni-
cal quantum gravity—and, insofar as our universe is concerned, unique. But
this doesn’t mean, as we have already seen, that the world it describes would
be static and timeless. No longer part of the state description, the universal
wave function Ψ provides a representation of dynamical law, via the vector
field on configuration space that it defines. As such, the wave function plays
a role analogous to that of the Hamiltonian functionH = H(Q,P ) ≡ H(ξ) in
classical mechanics—a function on phase space, a space even more abstract
than configuration space. In fact, the wave function and the Hamiltonian
function generate motions in pretty much the same way
dξ
dt
= DerH ←→
dQ
dt
= Der(logΨ) ,
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with Der a derivation. And few would be tempted to regard the Hamiltonian
function H as a real physical field, or expect any back-action of particle
configurations on this Hamiltonian function.
Once we recognize that the role of the wave function is thus nomologi-
cal, two important questions naturally arise: Why and how should a formal-
ism involving time-dependent wave functions obeying Schro¨dinger’s equation
emerge from a theory involving a fixed timeless universal wave function? And
which principle singles out the special unique wave function Ψ that governs
the motion in our universe? Our answers to these questions are somewhat
speculative. But they do provide further insight into the role of the wave
function in quantum mechanics and might even explain why, in fact, our
world is quantum mechanical.
In order to understand the emergence of a time-dependent wave function,
we must ask the right question, which is this: Is it ever possible to find a
simple effective theory governing the behavior of suitable subsystems of a
Bohmian universe? Suppose, then, that the configuration of the universe
has a decomposition of the form q = (x, y), where x describes the degrees
of freedom with which we are somehow most directly concerned (defining
the subsystem, the “x-system”) and y describes the remaining degrees of
freedom (the subsystem’s environment , the “y-system”). For example, x
might be the configuration of all the degrees of freedom governed by standard
quantum field theory, describing the fermionic matter fields as well as the
bosonic force fields, while y refers to the gravitational degrees of freedom.
Suppose further that we have, corresponding to this decomposition, a solution
Q(τ) = (X(τ), Y (τ)) of the appropriate (yet to be defined) extension of (6),
where the real continuous parameter τ labels the slices in a suitable foliation
of space-time.
Focus now on the conditional wave function
ψτ (x) = Ψ(x, Y (τ)) (7)
of the subsystem, governing its motion, and ask whether ψτ (x) could be—
and might under suitable conditions be expected to be—governed by a simple
law that does not refer directly to its environment. (The conditional wave
function of the x-system should be regarded as defined only up to a factor
that does not depend upon x.)
Suppose that Ψ satisfies an equation of the form (2), with Ĥ = {ĤN}.
Suppose further that for y in some “y-region” of configuration space and for
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some choice of lapse function N we have that ĤN ≃ Ĥ
(x)
N + Ĥ
(y)
N and can
write
Ψ(x, y) = e−iτĤNΨ(x, y) ≃ e−iτĤN
∑
α
ψα0 (x)φ
α
0 (y)
≃
∑
α
(
e−iτĤ
(x)
N ψα0 (x)
)(
e−iτĤ
(y)
N φα0 (y)
)
=:
∑
α
ψατ (x)φ
α
τ (y) (8)
where the φα0 are “narrow disjoint wave packets” and remain approximately
so as long as τ is not too large. Suppose (as would be the case for Bohmian
mechanics) that the motion is such that if the configuration Y (0) lies in the
support of one φα
′
0 , then Y (τ) will keep up with φ
α′
τ as long as the above
conditions are satisfied. It then follows from (8) that for the conditional
wave function of the subsystem we have
ψτ (x) ≈ ψ
α′
τ ,
and it thus approximately satisfies the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation
i
∂ψ
∂τ
= Ĥ
(x)
N ψ . (9)
(In the case of (an extension of) Bohmian quantum gravity with preferred
foliation, this foliation must correspond to the lapse function N in (8).)
We may allow here for an interaction ŴN(x, y) between the subsystem
and its environment in the Hamiltonian in (8), provided that the influence of
the x-system on the y-system is negligible. In this case we can replace Ĥ
(x)
N
in (8) and (9) by Ĥ
(x)
N (Y (τ)) ≡ Ĥ
(x)
N + ŴN(x, Y (τ)), since the wave packets
φα(y) are assumed to be narrow. Think, for the simplest example, of the case
in which the y-system is the gravitational field and the x-system consists of
very light particles.
Now one physical situation (which can be regarded as corresponding to a
region of configuration space) in which (8), and hence the Schro¨dinger evolu-
tion (9), should obtain is when the y-system behaves semiclassically: In the
semiclassical regime, one expects an initial collection of narrow and approxi-
mately disjoint wave packets φα0 (y) to remain so under their (approximately
classical) evolution.
As a matter of fact, the emergence of Schro¨dinger’s equation in the semi-
classical regime for gravity can be justified in a more systematic way, using
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perturbation theory, by expanding Ψ in powers of the gravitational constant
κ. Then for a “semiclassical wave function” Ψ, the phase S of Ψ, to leading
order, κ−1, depends only on the 3-metric and obeys the classical Einstein-
Hamilton-Jacobi equation, so that the metric evolves approximately classi-
cally, with the conditional wave function for the matter degrees of freedom
satisfying, to leading (zeroth) order, Schro¨dinger’s equation for, say, quan-
tum field theory on a given evolving background. The relevant analysis was
done by Banks [3] for canonical quantum gravity, but the significance of that
analysis is rather obscure from an orthodox perspective:
The semiclassical limit has been proposed as a solution to the problem of
time in quantum gravity, and as such has been severely criticized by Kucharˇ
[17], who concludes his critique by observing that “the semiclassical inter-
pretation does not solve the standard problems of time. It merely obscures
them by the approximation procedure and, along the way, creates more prob-
lems.” Perhaps the main difficulty is that, within the orthodox framework,
the classical evolution of the metric is not really an approximation at all.
Rather, it is put in by hand, and can in no way be justified on the basis of an
entirely quantum mechanical treatment, even as an approximation. This is
in stark contrast with the status of the semiclassical approximation within a
Bohmian framework, for which there is no problem of time. In this approach,
the classical evolution of the metric is indeed merely an approximation to its
exact evolution, corresponding to the exact phase of the wave function (i.e.,
to equation (6)). To the extent that this approximation is valid, the appro-
priate conclusions can be drawn, but the theory makes sense, and suffers
from no conceptual problems, even when the approximation is not valid.
Now to our second question. Suppose that we demand of a universal
dynamics that it be first-order for the variables describing the primitive on-
tology (the simplest possibility for a dynamics) and covariant—involving no
preferred foliation, no special choice of lapse function N , in its formulation.
This places a very strong constraint on the vector field defining the law of
motion—and on the universal wave function, should this motion be gener-
ated by a wave function. The set of wave functions satisfying this constraint
should be very small, far smaller than the set of wave functions we normally
consider as possible initial states for a quantum system. However, according
to our conception of the wave function as nomological, this very fact might
well be a distinct virtue.
We have begun to investigate the possibility of a first-order covariant
geometrodynamics in connection with Bohmian quantum gravity, and have
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found that the constraint for general covariance is captured by the Dirac
algebra (see also Hojman, Kucharˇ and Teitelboim [13]), which expresses the
relation between successive infinitesimal deformations of hypersurfaces, taken
in different orders: We have shown (see Goldstein and Teufel [12]) that defin-
ing a representation of the Dirac algebra is more or less the necessary and
sufficient condition for a vector field on the space of 3-metrics to yield a gen-
erally covariant dynamics, generating a 4-geometry involving no dynamically
distinguished hypersurfaces.
This work is very much in its infancy. In addition to the problem of finding
a mathematically rigorous proof of the result just mentioned, there remains
the difficult question of the possible representations of the Dirac algebra,
both for pure gravity and for gravity plus matter. For pure gravity it seems
that a first-order generally covariant geometrodynamics is achievable, but
only with vector fields that generate classical 4-geometries—solutions of the
Einstein equations with a possible cosmological constant. How this situation
might be affected by the inclusion of matter is not easy to say.
Even a negative result—to the effect that a generally covariant Bohmian
theory must involve additional space-time structure—would be illuminating.
A positive result—to the effect that a first-order dynamics, for geometry plus
matter, that does not invoke additional space-time structure can be gener-
ally covariant more or less only when the vector field defining this dynamics
arises from an essentially unique wave function of the universe that happens
to satisfy an equation like the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (and from which
a time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation emerges, in the manner we’ve de-
scribed, as part of a phenomenological description governing the behavior of
appropriate subsystems)—would be profound. For then we would know, not
just what quantum mechanics is, but why it is.
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